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Understanding patterns of conflict and pathways in which political history became established is
critical to understanding how large states and empires ultimately develop and come to rule giveneScholarship  provides  open  access,  scholarly  publishing
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regions and influence subsequent events. We employ a spatiotemporal Cox regression model to
investigate possible causes as to why regions were attacked by the Neo-Assyrian (912-608 BCE)
state. The model helps to explain how strategic benefits and costs lead to likely pathways of conflict
and imperialism based on elite strategic decision-making. We apply this model to the early 9th
century BCE, a time when historical texts allow us to trace yearly campaigns in specific regions, to
understand how the Neo-Assyrian state began to re-emerge as a major political player, eventually
going on to dominate much of the Near East and starting a process of imperialism that shaped
the wider region for many centuries even after the fall of this state. The model demonstrates
why specific locations become regions of conflict in given campaigns, emphasizing a degree of
consistency with which choices were made by invading forces with respect to a number of factors.
We find that elevation and population density deter Assyrian invasions. Moreover, costs were
found to be more of a clear motivator for Assyrian invasions, with distance constraints being
a significant driver in determining where to campaign. These outputs suggest that Assyria was
mainly interested in attacking its weakest, based on population and/or organization, and nearest
rivals as it began to expand. Results not only help to address the emergence of this empire, but
enable a generalized understanding of how benefits and costs to conflict can lead to imperialism
and pathways to political outcomes that can have major social relevance.
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Understanding patterns of conflict and pathways in which political 
history became established is critical to understanding how large 
states and empires ultimately develop and come to rule given regions 
and influence subsequent events. We employ a spatiotemporal Cox 
regression model to investigate possible causes as to why regions 
were attacked by the Neo-Assyrian (912-608 BCE) state. The model 
helps to explain how strategic benefits and costs lead to likely 
pathways of conflict and imperialism based on elite strategic 
decision-making. We apply this model to the early 9th century BCE, a 
time when historical texts allow us to trace yearly campaigns in 
specific regions, to understand how the Neo-Assyrian state began to 
re-emerge as a major political player, eventually going on to 
dominate much of the Near East and starting a process of imperialism 
that shaped the wider region for many centuries even after the fall of 
this state. The model demonstrates why specific locations become 
regions of conflict in given campaigns, emphasizing a degree of 
consistency with which choices were made by invading forces with 
respect to a number of factors. We find that elevation and population 
density deter Assyrian invasions. Moreover, costs were found to be 
more of a clear motivator for Assyrian invasions, with distance 
constraints being a significant driver in determining where to 
campaign. These outputs suggest that Assyria was mainly interested 
in attacking its weakest, based on population and/or organization, 
and nearest rivals as it began to expand. Results not only help to 
address the emergence of this empire, but enable a generalized 
understanding of how benefits and costs to conflict can lead to 
imperialism and pathways to political outcomes that can have major 




The Neo-Assyrian period (912–608 BCE) was a time when the Assyrians politically 
dominated large parts of the Near East. By the early ninth century BCE, a series of 
campaigns by the new Assyrian king, Ashurnasirpal II (r. 883–859 BCE), began to 
shape the region that ultimately led to the establishment of a large-scale empire by 
the eighth century BCE that dominated much of the Near East until the end of the 
seventh century BCE (Cline and Graham 2011). The empire became the largest 
state in the ancient Near East and had direct influence on many cultural groups, 
but it also began a long process whereby empires and imperialism became the 
norm in the Near East as successive states and empires began to dominate even 
more territory. This makes the early ninth century BCE an important period to 
investigate if we are to understand how this long process of imperialism emerged 
and the strategic path dependencies in which later decisions were shaped by 
earlier outcomes. 
  Often,  most ancient states’ strategic decisions are difficult to evaluate and 
understand within contemporary contexts. Particularly, historical data are usually 
missing  and the problem of identifying ancient toponyms  makes  key battles, 
alliances, and events difficult to place in time and space. Furthermore, multiple 
factors affect strategic circumstances of states at any given time, making historical 
contexts often unclear for researchers and important questions, such as why and 
how the process of imperialism in a given region began, hard to answer. In this 
paper, we propose a method that evaluates strategic military decision-making by 
elites that affected pathways in which the Neo-Assyrian Empire began to emerge. 
This model considers the likelihood and propensity of given states to be attacked 
by the Neo-Assyrians and addresses what factors could determine observed 
conflict. We demonstrate the utility of a spatiotemporal Cox regression model that 
investigates the determinants of strategic decisions and the context of relevant 
political dynamics and spatial scales. Our goal is to better understand why certain 
states were attacked by the Neo-Assyrians and uncover the underlying processes 
that could have shaped their strategic decision-making. 
  We begin this paper by providing background into the case study, specifically 
the early ninth  century BCE when the Neo-Assyrian state began to more 
aggressively launch yearly campaigns against neighboring states and key decisions 
by its leadership shaped which states increasingly came into conflict with the Neo-
Assyrians. Next, we articulate a series of six hypotheses concerning factors that 
might have influenced these decisions and which are testable via the proposed 
model. We then present our model, demonstrating its suitability for addressing 
questions concerning where and when given campaigns are fought. The model 
results are considered in the context of strategic decision-making undertaken by 
the elite. We see that elevation and population density appear to deter Assyrian 
invasion.  The clearest results, however,  show that deterrence in the form of Baudains et al.:  Modeling Decisions in Neo-Assyria.  Cliodynamics 6:1 (2015) 
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distance to the Assyrian army is the largest driver affecting Assyrian invasion. 
Given these results, we conclude by considering the extent to which the presented 
approach answers our research goal and how it might be applicable to other cases.  
Historical Background 
Assyria's documented history stretches back to c. 2000 BCE. Originally a small state 
centered on the city of Ashur (modern Qal'at Sherqat) in northern Mesopotamia, it 
again rose to prominence during the Late Bronze Age (c. 1600–1200 BCE), when it 
gained independence from the neighboring kingdom of Mitanni, located in the 
Khabur region in upper Mesopotamia, and embarked on a program of territorial 
expansion (Radner 2014). The Assyrian king Ashur-uballit (r. 1365–1330 BCE) 
cemented Assyria's newfound status by becoming a latecomer to the so-called 
Great Powers Club, a group of powerful states that dominated the Near East in the 
Late Bronze Age (Moran 1992).  
  Although the collapse of the Late Bronze Age system around 1200 BCE 
dramatically redesigned the political landscape of the Near East (Radner 2014), 
leading to the disappearance of the Hittite empire and a weakening of the once-
powerful Egyptian and Babylonian states, Assyria emerged less affected, putting it 
in a relatively good political position. During the reign of Tiglath-pileser I (r. 1114–
1076 BCE), Assyrian territory continued to encompass a significant part of 
northern Mesopotamia, and Tiglath-pileser sought to extend Assyria's boundaries 
further  by campaigning repeatedly to the west of the Euphrates river. His 
immediate successors, however, were less successful and by the start of the first 
millennium BCE, Assyria's territorial holdings had been pushed back to a modest 
strip of land bordering the Tigris River. The end of the tenth century, however, saw 
the start of renewed efforts to regain Assyria's former status. This marked the 
beginning of the Neo-Assyrian period (934–610 BCE), during which Assyria would 
emerge as the most powerful empire to date, controlling most of the ancient Near 
East (Cline and Graham 2011).  
  The reign of king Ashurnasirpal II (r. 883–859 BCE) was instrumental in 
Assyria's rise to greatness, ultimately having an impact long after the fall of Assyria, 
as the ninth century ushered the beginning of a millennia-long period of large-scale 
empires and states dominating the region. From his ascension, Ashurnasirpal 
pursued the policy of restoration and conquest begun by his grandfather Adad-
nirari II (r. 911–891 BCE), but expanded  it to a greater scale, campaigning 
vigorously and regularly:  his inscriptions record no fewer than 14 military 
campaigns during his 24 years on the throne. He was particularly active in the first 
few years of his reign, sometimes conducting two separate campaigns in a single 
year (Grayson 1982:253). The primary focus of his exploits were the regions to the 
east, north, and west of the empire's heartland, which lay between the cities Ashur, 
Nineveh (modern Mosul), and Arbela (Erbil; Radner 2011). Figure 1 shows the map Baudains et al.:  Modeling Decisions in Neo-Assyria.  Cliodynamics 6:1 (2015) 
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of the region at the beginning of Ashurnasipal’s reign, including the principal 
Assyrian cities, and the states that existed during this time. Advances in military 
technology, including more efficient siege machines and reliance on cavalry rather 
than chariotry, improved the effectiveness of the Assyrian army (Fischer 
1998:205). At the same time, Ashurnasirpal made contributions to the system of 
provincial administration, under which conquered regions were put under the 
control of an Assyrian governor and subjected to regular tribute (Grayson 
1982:258). Mass deportations of local populations sought not only to distribute 
manpower where it was needed, but also to minimize the risk of future revolts 
(Oded 1979).  
Ashurnasirpal’s Campaigns  
The region of Mazamua, located in parts of modern Iraqi Kurdistan and parts of 
western Iran (Figure 1: states 0, 9, 21, 37, and 41), was the site of three Assyrian 
expeditions between 881 and 880 BCE. Located to the northeast of Assyria, it 
represented an important gateway to the Iranian plateau and its rich trade 
network. The region may have been under Assyrian control prior to 
Ashurnasirpal’s reign but rebelled soon after his accession. Having put down the 
revolts, Ashurnasirpal stamped his authority on the region by renovating the city 
Atlila, likely located in Figure 1:9, and giving it an Assyrian name, Dur-Ashur 
("fortress of the god Ashur"). For the next two centuries, the city served as a 
garrison from which armed expeditions in the Zagros Mountains could be launched 
easily and with minimal delay (Radner 2013:442). 
  The middle Euphrates region engaged Ashurnasirpal intermittently from 878 
BCE. In that year, the new ruler of Suhu (Figure 1:35), aided by the Babylonians, 
rebelled against  Assyria. The revolt was eventually joined by the  neighboring 
states of Laqu (Figure 1:24) and Hindanu (Figure 1:16), and despite swift and harsh 
retaliation from Ashurnasirpal, rebellions continued to break out in the region 
(Grayson 1991).  
  Ashurnasirpal's expeditions to the west took him from Bit-Bahiani (Figure 1:6) 
and Hatti (Figure 1:15) in Syria as far as the Levantine coast, where the king 
performed the traditional ritual of washing his weapons in the Mediterranean Sea 
(Grayson 1991:298). He received tribute from local rulers and cut down trees in 
the cedar groves of Lebanon, whose wood had been highly prized by 
Mesopotamian kings since the third millennium BCE (Klein and Abraham 2000). 
Although no direct Assyrian control was established in this region, the expedition 
served an important political and ideological purpose, raising Assyria's visibility 
and status and extending the empire's symbolic presence to the Mediterranean 
Sea, a representation of one of the traditional boundaries of the "officially existing" 
world (Liverani 1990:59).  Baudains et al.:  Modeling Decisions in Neo-Assyria.  Cliodynamics 6:1 (2015) 
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  As a result of Ashurnasirpal's skilled leadership and military exploits, Assyria 
regained territories that had been lost centuries earlier and established itself as 
one of the leading powers of the ancient Near East. Ashurnasirpal's successors 
would capitalize on this momentum to further extend Assyria's territorial gains 
and political influence. At its height in the seventh century BCE, the Assyrian 
empire controlled a vast territory, which stretched from Egypt in the southwest to 
the mountainous regions of the Taurus and Zagros ranges in the north and east, 
and the Persian Gulf in the south. Even after its defeat at the hands of the 
Babylonians and the Medes by 610 BCE, Assyrian influence continued to be felt. Its 
imperial dominance set the tone for its successors, from the Neo-Babylonian, 
Achaemenid, Seleucid empires, and perhaps even to the Abbasid Caliphate, which 
ruled the Middle East from its Mesopotamian capital into the thirteenth century CE 
(Cline  and Graham 2011). The Achaemenids, for example, replicated or were 
influenced by innovations made by the Assyrians in governing and military affairs. 
Historical Sources 
The reign of Ashurnasirpal is relatively well-documented. Like his predecessors, 
Ashurnasirpal commemorated his achievements in official inscriptions recorded 
on a variety of media, from palace walls and free-standing steles to clay prisms 
buried in the foundations of important buildings (Grayson 1991:189-393). A large 
number of such compositions survive from Ashurnasirpal's new royal residence, 
Kalhu (modern Nimrud; Figure 1), whose buildings and public areas were lavishly 
decorated with images and texts celebrating the king's deeds. Royal inscriptions 
invariably take the form of an autobiographical account and, in accordance with 
the demands of Assyrian royal ideology, tend to focus on the king's role as military 
leader. The result is a series of detailed accounts of military campaigns led by the 
king, narrated in chronological order or grouped thematically (or even a 
combination of the two). Campaign narratives may include information about the 
route followed by the army, enemy casualties, and tribute or loot (Tadmor 1997).  
  Despite their obvious appeal as historical records, royal inscriptions remain a 
problematic source whose very genre defies modern classification. The 
information included in them was carefully selected by the royal scribes in order 
to portray their royal masters in the best possible light, and edited as the need 
arose to accommodate additional material or constraints of space. The scribes who 
composed royal inscriptions availed themselves of a range of source materials, 
including contemporary records and itineraries, but also literary narratives and 
mythological accounts designed to convey an ideological message about the 
supremacy of the Assyrian king (Tadmor 1997).  
  One way of strengthening this message was to maintain the fiction of a single 
army led by the king, who alone is responsible for all victories; for rare exceptions 
to this convention, see Yamada (2000:26, 221–222) and Niederreiter (2005). In Baudains et al.:  Modeling Decisions in Neo-Assyria.  Cliodynamics 6:1 (2015) 
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reality, the Assyrian empire must have relied on multiple armies with some 
military leadership delegated to generals, but this is almost never reflected in 
official texts. Although inscriptions often record quite detailed information about 
the army's itinerary, it is not always possible to reconstruct this as accurately as 
we might like, due to the difficulties of correlating ancient and modern toponyms.  
 
Figure 1. Map of Assyria (4) and surrounding states in c. 883 BCE. Colors and 
numbers indicate states in the region in the early ninth century BC; dashed lines 
indicate modern borders, and solid lines indicate ancient borders.  
 Baudains et al.:  Modeling Decisions in Neo-Assyria.  Cliodynamics 6:1 (2015) 
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  Our knowledge of the reality of Assyrian state governance in the eighth and 
seventh centuries BCE is enhanced immeasurably through surviving corpora of 
letters exchanged between the king and his officials (Parpola 1987; Lanfranchi and 
Parpola 1990; Fuchs and Parpola 2001; Luukko and Van Buylaere 2002; Dietrich 
2003; Reynolds 2003; Luukko 2012). This state correspondence allows us to 
counterbalance the elevated rhetoric of royal inscriptions with more down-to-
earth and mundane communiqués and to fill in important information gaps that 
facilitated Assyria’s wars and expansion. However, no such archives survive from 
the reign of Ashurnasirpal, and we do not have complementary sources from 
outside Assyria to corroborate royal inscriptions or provide an alternative point of 
view.  
Hypotheses 
We investigate the factors that might have influenced the Assyrian army’s decision 
to invade a particular state and compare this choice with other states that might 
have been chosen but were not. In this section, we derive a number of testable 
hypotheses concerning attributes of the states invaded that may have played a role 
in these decisions. Two types of attributes are considered:  the costs that the 
invading Assyrian army would have to endure should they select that state and the 
potential opportunities associated with each state should their invasion be 
successful. Categorizing the attributes of each state into ‘push’ (i.e., costs such as 
elevation, organized defense, etc.) and ‘pull’ (e.g., benefits such as metals, distance 
to trade, etc.) factors from the perspective of the Assyrian army enables us to 
determine the balance between, on the one hand, whether the Assyrian army chose 
states to invade by minimizing the effort expended in invading new territory and 
expanding the empire in accordance with the principle of least effort (Zipf 1949) 
and, on the other, whether they sought to maximize the potential opportunities 
associated with those choices. In what follows, we derive six hypotheses that are 
used in the construction of the model, each of which can be considered as either a 
cost or a benefit associated with the target selection of the Assyrians.  
  The re-emergence of the Assyrian empire during the period under 
consideration occurred over a relatively short time-scale. As a consequence, there 
may have been time constraints on the decisions made by the army, with invasions 
taking place in certain states simply because they were en route to more desirable 
locations. In this way, some states that were a long distance from the location of 
the Assyrian army may have been seen as undesirable, given the time and effort it 
would have taken to travel there. Travel might have been viewed as a significant 
cost associated with selecting states to invade. As a consequence, our first 
hypothesis asserts: Baudains et al.:  Modeling Decisions in Neo-Assyria.  Cliodynamics 6:1 (2015) 
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Hypothesis 1. The Assyrian army was more likely to invade states that were near 
to their previously recorded location. 
  As well as the distance to potential invasion sites, there are other factors that 
may have influenced the Assyrians’  cost of travelling. We hypothesize that a 
significant cost may have arisen if the terrain led to difficulty in travelling through 
the state. More mountainous regions, for instance, would have likely led to higher 
perceived costs by the army. In addition, uneven or high terrain might have favored 
the population of that state, who may have turned to insurgent tactics to counter 
the threat posed by the Assyrians. There is evidence to suggest that mountainous 
regions are more likely to provide favorable conditions for insurgencies during 
modern conflicts (Fearon and Laitin 2003). Our second hypothesis states: 
Hypothesis 2. The Assyrian army was more likely to favor invading states with 
low mean elevation. 
  There is evidence to suggest that the invaded states had some resistance to the 
Assyrian army (Tadmor 1997) and it is likely that the Assyrian army encountered 
a number of militant groups of varying strengths during invasions. Our next 
hypothesis asserts that if the states were able to organize effective defense via 
these militant groups, the Assyrians would have been deterred from invading. The 
Assyrian army might have considered effective defense of a state to be a significant 
cost due to the potential for damaging the strength of the army via, for instance, 
Assyrian loss of life. In order to estimate the military potential of each state, we use 
a measure of population density, the operationalization of which is described in the 
sections that follow. In particular, we suppose that states with high population 
density will have had the organizational capacity to enable more effective defense. 
Thus, our third hypothesis states: 
Hypothesis 3. States with organizational capacity to enable effective defense, for 
which high population density serves as a proxy, were less likely to be invaded by 
the Assyrian army.  
  Certain states may have also made alliances with contiguous states in order to 
counter the threat posed by the Assyrian army. Indeed, the empirical record 
mentions three instances of alliance formation between the smaller states. 
Although the available data do not allow us to test a formal hypothesis regarding 
whether these alliances were successful in deterring the Assyrians, we consider 
whether other such alliances might have been made after Assyrian invasion. The 
specification of the model used to detect such effects is discussed in the results 
section.  
  As well as invading states in order to expand the empire, the Assyrians may 
have invaded some states because control over those states offered more tangible 
benefits and opportunities. In particular, the attributes of each of the states may 
have had a significant influence in selecting the states to invade. We hypothesize 
that states with more desirable attributes were more at risk to invasion. We Baudains et al.:  Modeling Decisions in Neo-Assyria.  Cliodynamics 6:1 (2015) 
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consider three attributes of each state, which represent the associated 
opportunities that may have attracted invasion by the Assyrians.  
  First, we hypothesize that states with better conditions for agriculture are likely 
to be more desirable to the Assyrians. Although current rainfall conditions are 
likely to differ from those of the past, we consider the modern level of precipitation 
of each state (NOAA 2014) as a proxy for past agricultural conditions, leading to: 
Hypothesis 4. States with higher levels of precipitation were more likely to be 
invaded. 
  Next, we hypothesize that the Assyrians were attracted to a particular area for 
its level of natural resources, specifically iron deposits, which became increasingly 
desired for creating iron weapons and tools during the Iron Age (Maxwell-Hyslop 
1974), leading to: 
Hypothesis 5. States with higher levels of metal resources were more likely to be 
invaded. 
  Our final hypothesis asserts that the Assyrians sought to seek out new trading 
opportunities to the west, which were likely to have been more prevalent towards 
the coast of the Near East (Sherratt and Sherratt 1993), leading to: 
Hypothesis 6. States that were closer to the Mediterranean coast were more likely 
to be invaded. 
  In what follows, we describe our analytical approach, which includes an 
overview of the dependent and independent data used in our analysis. We then 
present the results of our analysis, which enable us to evaluate each of the 
hypotheses stated above.  
Methodology 
The onset and evolution of conflict, particularly with regards to historical conflict, 
is traditionally discussed using anecdotal perspectives, rather than by employing 
mathematical or statistical models to seek out underlying mechanisms or patterns 
that might be exploited to obtain insights. More recently, there has been a dramatic 
increase in the quantity and quality of such models exploring the location and 
timings of various examples of conflict (Turchin 2003; Weidmann and Ward 2010; 
Zammit-Mangion et al. 2012; Turchin et al. 2013; Bhavnani et al. 2014). This is 
partly due to increased data availability, which is crucial for modeling because it 
enables the development of models that are empirically consistent, and partly due 
to an increased range of sophisticated modeling techniques, some of which are 
well-suited to scenarios involving only partial data. Indeed, historical conflicts pose 
an additional complication because available data are typically scarce, biased, or 
often interpreted from other sources.  In many cases, the availability of data 
constrains the sophistication with which models can be constructed. Baudains et al.:  Modeling Decisions in Neo-Assyria.  Cliodynamics 6:1 (2015) 
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  The dependent variable used in this study is given by the states that are invaded 
by the Assyrian army, as detailed through inscriptions made during the reign of 
Ashurnasirpal (Grayson 1991). The descriptions of the activities of the Assyrian 
army were collated and, where possible, georeferenced according to the state in 
which each activity occurred. The geographic data were obtained from using a 
geographic study (Liverani 1992) of the Assyrian state at the time of 
Ashurnasirpal’s rise. The data are made available as supplementary data to this 
work. In total, 65 separate invasion activities were identified between 883–865 BC 
and used in the analysis. Figure 2 shows a thematic map of the geographic area 
under consideration, with counts for the number of times each state was invaded 
as the dependent variable. 
  We propose a spatiotemporal Cox regression model to investigate the 
relationship between the invasions of the Assyrian army and the costs and benefits 
associated with those decisions. The model estimates the likelihood that each state 
will be selected as a target and has two components. The first captures inherent 
variation in the times at which Assyrian invasions took place, variation which is 
not dependent on the states themselves but is due to other factors that influence 
campaign times. Variation in attack frequency might, for example, arise due to 
external factors such as the weather or army weariness. We do not explicitly model 
this natural variation, but retain the term in the model to demonstrate that the 
states themselves are not the only factors influencing the timings of the attacks. 
The second component in the model considers the differences in each of the states 
at the times at which these campaigns took place, and supposes that the decisions 
made by the Assyrians with regards to where to invade depended on these 
differences. In an attempt to capture the variation across different spatial regions, 
a number of independent variables are incorporated into the model. We now 
outline our model before explaining how each of the independent variables is 
operationalized.  
  We suppose that the Assyrian army invades one of 𝑁𝑁 surrounding states at 
times given by the random variables T1, T2, …, TJ and that, at each time TJ, the  
random variable SJ ∈ {1,2, …, N} denotes the specific state that is invaded. Thus, the 
actions of the Assyrian army are summarized by the sequence of tuples given by 
(T1, S1), (T2, S2), …, (TJ, SJ). 
  Following previous studies that consider the time until events occur within a 
geographic area (e.g., Myers 1997; Raleigh and Hegre, 2009), we model the hazard 
function λi(t) for state i, taken to be the instantaneous risk at time t that state i will 
be invaded. This is formally defined as  
 








Figure 2: Choropleth map of the study area (Assyria and surrounding states), 
detailing the number of times each state was invaded by the Assyrian army 
between 883–865 BC. 
 
where TJ is a random variable specifying the time of the next invasion, assuming 
that invasions at times T1, T2, …, TJ−1 have already taken place.  
  The Cox regression model, first described in Cox (1972) and further elaborated 
upon in several subsequent papers (Cox 1975; Anderson and Gill 1982; Gill 1984), 
assumes that pure temporal variation in the frequency of event occurrence can be 
separated from dependencies specific to each of the different areas i. Specifically, 
it supposes that the hazard function can be written as: 
 
(2)                𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖�𝑡𝑡�𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)� = 𝗼𝗼(𝑡𝑡)exp(𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)𝑇𝑇𝗽𝗽), 
 
for each area i for a temporally dependent baseline hazard α(t) and temporally 
varying covariates zi(t) with a vector of parameters β.  
  An advantage of this form of the model is that to estimate the parameters β, 
representing the effect from the independent variables on the risk of invasion, an 
explicit form of the baseline hazard α(t) is not required, and purely time-varying 
actions of the Assyrian army can be neglected. As a consequence, the times T1, T2, 
…, TJ can be treated as given and the task is reduced to modelling the associated 
random variables S1, S2, …, SJ , which detail the invaded state. This highlights a 
particular strength of the Cox regression approach: the precise event times are, in 
fact, irrelevant and only the order in which states are attacked is required to 
estimate the parameters β. For the case of the Neo-Assyrian campaigns, this is 
particularly salient because accurate dates are not recorded by inscriptions, but Baudains et al.:  Modeling Decisions in Neo-Assyria.  Cliodynamics 6:1 (2015) 
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the order in which the inscriptions are presented give an indication of the ordering 
of invasions during any given campaign.  
  The conditional probability that state i is invaded at time TJ, given that we know 
that one state is invaded at that time, is given by 
 









and the parameters β are found via maximization of the partial likelihood function 
given by 
 












𝑗𝑗=1 ,   
 
where 1(SJ = i) is an indicator function, equal to one if SJ = i and equal to zero 
otherwise. Note that the model estimates a counting process rather than a survival 
process because it is possible that each state can be invaded more than once (see 
Anderson and Gill, 1982; Gill, 1984).  
  In what follows, the independent variables denoted by zi(t) that are used to 
populate the model are described. The first variable to be incorporated is required 
to evaluate hypothesis 1 and measures the distance between the Assyrian army’s 
previous location and each state for each time period during the study. This is 
calculated as the geographic distance between the centroid of the state of the last 
invasion, and the centroid of the state in question (measured in units of 100 km).  
  The  second variable is a measure of the mean elevation of each state, as 
obtained from a Level 1 digital elevation model (DEM; USGS 2014). The mean 
elevations are included in the model using units of 100 m for ease of interpretation 
of the parameter values. 
  Determining the potential defense within each state, and the danger to the 
Assyrian army being invaded, is given by the population density of each state, 
which is calculated by relative size of settlements found in given regions modeled 
(Liverani 1992; Wilkinson et al. 2005; Wilkinson et al. 2007; Radner 2014). 
Although these estimates are not precise, they allow us to determine areas where 
we expect relatively more or less people being concentrated based on historical 
and archaeological data in the region. Values are assigned 1–4, with 4 indicating 
the highest population; values indicate the relative degree to which given regions 
were more populated than others. These values are then divided by the area of each 
state, as measured in units of 100 km2. 
  Average precipitation, obtained from NOAA (2014),  is used to determine 
whether a state was suitable for agriculture. Although these are modern data, Baudains et al.:  Modeling Decisions in Neo-Assyria.  Cliodynamics 6:1 (2015) 
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paleoclimate studies show  the current pattern is similar to  the Iron Age 
precipitation ranges (Issar and Zohar 2007), or at least indicate relatively which 
regions are wetter or drier (e.g., along the Mediterranean coast). The average 
precipitation is measured in units of 100 mm for ease of interpretation. 
  The amount of metal resources available in each state is estimated by relative 
distance from iron deposits known in the region (Maxwell-Hyslop 1974), and in 
Anatolia in particular. States that are closer to known deposits score higher (i.e., a 
value of 2 or 3), whereas states that are farther away score lower (i.e., 1). Figure 3 
shows some of the relevant variables utilized in the model. 
  A further variable is added to incorporate a measure of the distance of each 
state to the coast. This is given by calculating the geographic distance between the 
centroid of each state and the nearest coastal location; it is taken in units of 100 km 
for ease of interpreting the corresponding parameter estimates. This variable acts 
as a proxy for access to beneficial trade routes that emerged along the coast 
(Sherratt and Sherratt 1993). 
  Finally, two control variables are also included in order to alleviate problems 
associated with unobserved heterogeneity and the varying geography of the study 
area. The first control, indicating the number of previous times that each state had 
been invaded by the Assyrians at each point in time, reduces potential bias 
resulting from unobserved heterogeneity. This arises when factors that are largely 
responsible for influencing the choices made are not included in the model. 
Unobserved heterogeneity may also influence parameter estimates of those 
variables that are included in the model. Incorporating the number of prior 
invasions for each state goes some way to incorporate some of the factors that 
influenced the Assyrians’ choices that we have not (or could not) incorporate into 
the model. The area of each state is also included as a control variable because the 
states vary considerably in size. As a consequence, even if the invasions were made 
completely at random, it is likely that some states would be more invaded than 
others if they are larger. Including this variable reduces size as a source of bias.  
  The final expression for the hazard function 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) is given by 
 
(5) 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖�𝑡𝑡�𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)� = 𝗼𝗼(𝑡𝑡)exp(𝗽𝗽1𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) + 𝗽𝗽2𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 + 𝗽𝗽3𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝗽𝗽4𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 + 𝗽𝗽5𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 + 𝗽𝗽6𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 + 𝗽𝗽7𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 +
𝗽𝗽8𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)), 
 
where Di(t) is the distance between state i and the previous recorded location of 
the Assyrian army; Ei is the elevation of state i; Pi is the population density of state 
i; Ri is the precipitation in state i; Mi is the amount of metal resources in state i; Ci is 
the distance from state i to the coast; Ai is the area of state i; and Ii(t) is the number 
of prior invasions in state i. 




Figure 3: A selection of independent predictors of invasion frequency mapped on 
the study area of Assyria and surrounding states. 
Results 
The coxph function in the R survival package (Therneau 2013) was employed to 
estimate the parameters β. Fox (2002) provides an overview of its implementation 
with regards to time-varying covariates. Note that even though the dependent 
variables are time-dependent, the estimated parameters are not: the regression is 
performed over multiple time-steps and leads to one estimate for the relative effect 
of each variable.  
  Figure 4 summarizes the parameter estimates for two models: one containing 
only those variables which represent costs to the Assyrian army (Model 1) and one 
containing both costs and opportunities (Model 2). The exponential value of the 
parameter is plotted  (the odds ratio), together with a 95  percent  confidence 
interval for that estimate. This value is chosen for ease of interpretation and gives 
the estimated change in odds that a state will be invaded from a one-unit increase 
in the associated independent variable. To explain, if the  exponential  of the 
coefficient in eβ is equal to one, then any change in the associated variable has little 
effect on the risk of invasion. If eβ is greater than one, then a one-unit increase in 
the value of the associated variable increases the odds of invasion by a factor of eβ. 
Similarly, if eβ is less than one, then a one-unit increase in the associated variable 
decreases the odds of invasion multiplicatively by the same amount. 
  In keeping with Hypothesis 1, distance between the state and the Assyrian army 
is negatively associated with the risk of invasion in both models. Given that the 
values of the exponential of each parameter estimate is around 0.3, if all else is Baudains et al.:  Modeling Decisions in Neo-Assyria.  Cliodynamics 6:1 (2015) 
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equal, every 100 km between the state and the Assyrian army reduces the 
probability of invasion to around a third of what it otherwise would be.  
  An increase in elevation negatively impacts the likelihood of invasion, a finding 
in agreement with Hypothesis 2. This effect was significant in both models. With 
all other things being equal, every 100 m increase in the mean elevation of a state 
reduced the likelihood of invasion by 10–15 percent. 
  Population density, a proxy for the extent to which each state could coordinate 
effective defense, was significantly negatively associated with the probability of 
invasion in Model 1, in agreement with Hypothesis 3. In Model 2, in which both cost 
and opportunity variables were included, the effect was not significant at the 95 
percent level.  
 
Figure 4. Parameter estimates and associated 95 percent confidence intervals for 
each of the independent variables incorporated in the model. The left hand side 
presents a model containing costs to the Assyrian army and the right hand side 
presents a model with both costs and opportunities. If a confidence interval crosses 
the value 1, then the associated parameter is not significant at the 95 percent level 
and the confidence interval is shaded grey. 
 
  Only precipitation levels were found to be statistically significant opportunity 
for Neo-Assyrians that was predictive of invasion, supporting Hypothesis 4. Baudains et al.:  Modeling Decisions in Neo-Assyria.  Cliodynamics 6:1 (2015) 
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Specifically, states with relatively higher levels of precipitation, and therefore 
states which are more likely to have conditions suitable for agriculture, were more 
likely to be invaded by the Assyrians, suggesting that the benefits associated with 
potential for agriculture were a significant driver in their decision-making. The 
presence of metals (Hypothesis 5) and the distance to the coast (Hypothesis 6) 
were not significant predictors of invasion at the 95 percent level. 
  Finally, although the control variables incorporated did not test a specific 
hypothesis articulated in this section, it is interesting to note their direction. The 
point estimate for the area of the state was positively (but not significantly) 
associated with the probability of invasion, implying that larger states were more 
likely to be invaded.  
  The point estimate for the number of previous attacks was negatively 
associated with the probability of invasion and was significant for Model 2. This 
negative association indicates that the Assyrians might have favored invasion of 
states that they had not invaded previously, suggesting that expansion was one of 
their principal objectives.  
   Model 2 led to a slightly higher Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC; Akaike 
1974; Anderson 2008) score than Model 1 (298.08 vs. 298.50) despite the added 
variables. This suggests that the three opportunity variables (precipitation, metals, 
and distance to coast) do little to improve the model. Omitting the variables for 
metals and distance to coast but retaining the variable for precipitation resulted in 
an AIC value of 295.36, meaning that the inclusion of just the opportunity variable 
associated with better agricultural conditions leads to a better model. Parameter 
estimates and significance levels of this model were consistent with those shown 
in Model 1. 
  Table 1 presents an analysis of deviance table for Model 2. This table shows the 
results of a sequence of likelihood ratio tests to establish the extent to which the 
inclusion of each variable improves the model fit. The table is constructed as 
follows: beginning with a null model containing none of the independent variables, 
the log-likelihood is calculated. Eight models are then specified, each of which 
includes just one of the eight variables in Model 2. For each of these models, a 
likelihood ratio test is performed against the null model to determine whether the 
inclusion of each variable significantly improves model fit. The variable that 
increases the log-likelihood by the largest amount is selected as the next variable 
in the table (which, in this case, is distance from the army). This process is then 
repeated with the remaining variables, but instead of adding each variable to a null 
model, we add each remaining variable to a model containing just those variables 
that have already been shown to cause the largest improvement in model fit and 
which have, therefore, already been added to the table. Thus, the improvement in 
model fit that is due to each variable is determined, whilst, at each stage, 
controlling for the variables that are found to have the largest influence. The order Baudains et al.:  Modeling Decisions in Neo-Assyria.  Cliodynamics 6:1 (2015) 
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of the variables in the table provides some indication of the amount of explanatory 
power associated with each of them. 
 
Table 1. A series of likelihood ratio tests to determine whether the inclusion of 
each variable improved the log-likelihood value of Model 2.  
 
  To explain, the first variable is the distance from the Neo-Assyrian army; this 
variable increased the log-likelihood of a null model with no covariates from -
241.38 to -154.08, which was the maximum available increase of all possible 
covariates. The model improvement as a result of including this variable was highly 
significant (p < 10-5).  
  Considering the remaining variables, the next largest increase in the log-
likelihood from the model that included only “distance from army” was found by 
including the population density variable. The null hypothesis, that the model is 
not improved by the addition of this variable, can be rejected because p = 0.0010. 










Null model (with 
no variables) 
  -241.38   
Distance from army  0.3252 
(0.1424) 
-154.08  .0000 
Population density  0.4305 
(0.4780) 
-148.66  .0010 
Elevation  0.8376 
(0.0606) 
-145.70  .0151 
Previous attacks  0.8006 
(0.1114) 
-144.49  .1189 
Precipitation  1.2975 
(0.1292) 
-143.44  .1468 
Area  1.0881 
(0.0435) 
-141.68  .0609 
Metals  1.2603 
(0.2654) 
-141.32  .3951 
Distance to coast  1.0551 
(0.1465) 
-141.25  .7163 Baudains et al.:  Modeling Decisions in Neo-Assyria.  Cliodynamics 6:1 (2015) 
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  The next largest increase comes from the elevation variable, which was also the 
final variable that significantly improved the model. This finding supports the 
hypothesis that elevation played a significant role in deterring the Neo-Assyrian 
army. The inclusion of the precipitation variable did not appear to significantly 
improve model fit, suggesting that its significance for the AIC statistic (Figure 4) 
may arise from a confounding factor.  
  In summary, our results suggest that regions closer to the last recorded army 
location, with lower population density, and which had lower mean elevation were 
more likely to be invaded by the Neo-Assyrians. There is little evidence to suggest 
that the opportunity variables tested were capable of capturing these decisions.  
  Figure 5 maps the relative hazards for each state in the region for four different 
starting locations of the Neo-Assyrian army, as specified by Equation 3. A large 
amount of the modeled hazard depends on the location of the Neo-Assyrian army; 
however, the effect from other variables can also be observed because the risk does 
simply decay relative to the army’s location.  
 
Figure 5. The probability  that each state will invaded next, as calculated by 
Equation 3, for four starting points of the Neo-Assyrian Empire as indicated by the 
star. The location of the star indicates the location of the Assyrian army and the 
color of each state indicates the probability that the state will be the next one to be 
invaded. These probabilities span from 0 to 0.6. The state of Assyria is shaded 
white. 
 
  A model was also constructed in order to test whether there was any evidence 
of alliance formation amongst the invaded states and whether such alliances might 
then have had either a deterrent or an incentive effect for the Neo-Assyrians. In 
other words, were they more or less likely to invade states which had recently been Baudains et al.:  Modeling Decisions in Neo-Assyria.  Cliodynamics 6:1 (2015) 
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attacked and were those recently attacked states, therefore, more likely to have 
formed alliances? To construct this model, a dummy variable was included equal 
to one if a state or any of its contiguous neighbors had been invaded previously in 
the same campaign. It is supposed that these states were the ones most likely to 
form alliances.     
  For this model, an additional control variable was incorporated to alleviate 
potential errors from confounding variables. This control was another dummy 
variable that indicated whether each state was contiguous with the previously 
invaded state. If alliances between neighbors did indeed affect the decision-making 
of the Neo-Assyrians, then an effect would be expected for the remainder of the 
campaign, and not just for the next attack. Once this was controlled for, no 
significant effects of neighbor alliances on likelihood of invasion were observed. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
We have presented a spatiotemporal Cox regression model to determine  the 
attributes of states that made them more susceptible to invasion during the Neo-
Assyrian campaigns of the early ninth century BCE. The case study of the Neo-
Assyrian state is generally an ideal example of early empires because it is relatively 
well-documented, despite some limitations. Moreover, it is an important empire to 
understanding the long succession of empires that continued in the Near East long 
after the Neo-Assyrian Empire. In essence, our results provide an idea of what the 
impetus may have been that began this long process of empire formation in the 
region. 
  Our results suggest that the Neo-Assyrians were under constraints with regards 
to how far they could travel during any one campaign. Strategic decision-making 
by the king would,  therefore,  have played a key role in deciding where the 
campaigns were largely fought. We have investigated a series of hypotheses to 
determine whether, even within each of these campaigns, the decision-making of 
the Neo-Assyrians were informed by factors associated with costs and 
opportunities of the choices that might have been made. We conclude that 
consideration of the costs associated with invasion had a larger impact on decision-
making than opportunities. We find that distance of the army from potential states 
that could be attacked, elevation  (where elevation would be a deterrent to 
invasion), and population density (which could be a proxy for the extent to which 
different regions were able to organize effective defense) were significant factors 
affecting invasion. Including the opportunity variables of precipitation, distance to 
coast, and the availability of metal deposits only marginally improved the fit of the 
model. Overall, it appears that human and geographic factors likely affected the 
onset of conflict during the reign of Ashurnasirpal, which subsequently shaped 
conflict in the region later in the ninth century BCE (Yamada 2000) and likely later 
periods. In effect, it appears that Ashurnasirpal’s campaigns did have a practical Baudains et al.:  Modeling Decisions in Neo-Assyria.  Cliodynamics 6:1 (2015) 
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goal of attacking and defeating Assyria’s nearest potential rivals, particularly those 
which appeared to be less populated or organized. 
  Our study is limited mainly by the lack of data associated with this time period. 
Nevertheless, we have demonstrated how systematically applying mathematical 
models can help to understand and discuss some of the key drivers during such 
historical periods, even when there are data constraints. The model employed in 
this study is particularly well-suited to understanding the features of locations that 
affect their risk of invasion because it can incorporate time-varying covariates 
without requiring detailed information on the specific times at which the invasions 
occurred.  
  The method we employed presents a simple and easy-to-use approach for 
studying different possibilities as to why early empires, such as the Neo-Assyrian 
state, undertook expeditions and warfare. Whereas most cases of past empire 
formation are speculative or based on purely qualitative understanding of states’ 
motivations and their expansion, the approach we provide allows a quantitative-
based assessment of impetus for expansion and pathways in which states formed. 
Furthermore, this method is applicable to other states and empires because the 
data requirements are not a great burden to obtain, particularly for empires and 
states occurring after the Neo-Assyrian period. Well-dated archaeological data that 
signify attacks on states, for example, can be used in the place of historical records 
of invasions. The order and temporal circumstances of attacks could be checked by 
the modeling approach to determine motivation plausibility. A comparative 
approach among these states’ invasions may allow the approach presented here to 
be used to determine if similar patterns were also in effect. Overall, this approach 
is expandable to other cases, potentially even those with less data resolution. 
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